Abstract: This paper applies the evolutionary game (EG) theory to water resources allocation in river basin, and separately analyzes replicator dynamics and its evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) among the water resources manufacturers (WRMs) and between the WRM and the water resources administration (WRA), and solves the function of replicator dynamics and ESS, also does some stability analysis. This study suggests that: (1) the EG among the WRMs exists only one ESS; (2) EG between WRM and WRA exist two ESSs: (H, L), (L, H), (L, H) is the expected evolutionary direction; (3) The expecting profit of each participant decreases with the proportion of H strategy group increasing, which induces the conflict problem in the water resources allocation. Adopting the L strategy will increase expecting profit of all, the WRA adopt the incentive mechanism of handsome reward and heavy penalty (HRHP) will effectively control overpumping, solve conflict and improve profit.